An update for kernel is now available for openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4 Security Advisory openeuler-security@openeuler.org openEuler security committee openEuler-SA-2026-3531 Final 1.0 1.0 2026-08-30 Initial 2026-08-30 2026-08-30 openEuler SA Tool V1.0 2026-08-30 kernel security update An update for kernel is now available for openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4 The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself. Security Fix(es): In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ceph: fix pre-auth out-of-bounds read on snaptrace in ceph_handle_caps() ceph_handle_caps() reads snap_trace_len from the wire-format ceph_mds_caps header and uses it unconditionally to build a fake end pointer (snaptrace + snaptrace_len) that is later handed to ceph_update_snap_trace() in the CEPH_CAP_OP_IMPORT case: snaptrace = h + 1; snaptrace_len = le32_to_cpu(h->snap_trace_len); p = snaptrace + snaptrace_len; ... case CEPH_CAP_OP_IMPORT: if (snaptrace_len) { ... if (ceph_update_snap_trace(mdsc, snaptrace, snaptrace + snaptrace_len, false, &realm)) { ... } ceph_update_snap_trace() then decodes a struct ceph_mds_snap_realm from snaptrace using ceph_decode_need(&p, e, sizeof(*ri), bad) with the attacker-supplied fake end e == snaptrace + snaptrace_len. With snaptrace_len == 0xFFFFFFFF the bound check is trivially satisfied, ri = p reads sizeof(struct ceph_mds_snap_realm) past the legitimate msg->front buffer, and ri->num_snaps / ri->num_prior_parent_snaps then drive further out-of-bounds reads of the encoded snap arrays. The eleven msg_version >= 2 .. msg_version >= 12 decoder blocks above the op switch each catch this OOB through their ceph_decode_*_safe() / ceph_decode_need() helpers, but they sit behind a hdr.version-gated if, so a malicious or compromised MDS that sets msg->hdr.version = 1 reaches the IMPORT path with no version-gated decoder having validated snap_trace_len. The shape has been present since ceph_handle_caps() was introduced. Validate snap_trace_len against the message front buffer before consuming it, using the canonical ceph_decode_need() / ceph_has_room() helper. The helper bounds the length with subtraction (n <= end - p, guarded by end >= p) rather than pointer addition, so it is wrap-safe for the attacker-controlled u32 length on 32-bit builds where p + snap_trace_len could overflow the address space. This matches the rest of the ceph decode path (e.g. the pool_ns_len check a few lines below), and the existing goto bad cleanup already covers this exit path.(CVE-2026-68160) An update for kernel is now available for openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4/openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3/openEuler-24.03-LTS/openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2. openEuler Security has rated this update as having a security impact of critical. A Common Vunlnerability Scoring System(CVSS)base score,which gives a detailed severity rating, is available for each vulnerability from the CVElink(s) in the References section. Critical kernel https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-3531 https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-68160 https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-68160 openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4 bpftool-4.19.90-2608.5.0.0387.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm bpftool-debuginfo-4.19.90-2608.5.0.0387.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm kernel-4.19.90-2608.5.0.0387.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm kernel-debuginfo-4.19.90-2608.5.0.0387.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm kernel-debugsource-4.19.90-2608.5.0.0387.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm kernel-devel-4.19.90-2608.5.0.0387.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm kernel-source-4.19.90-2608.5.0.0387.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm kernel-tools-4.19.90-2608.5.0.0387.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm kernel-tools-debuginfo-4.19.90-2608.5.0.0387.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm kernel-tools-devel-4.19.90-2608.5.0.0387.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm perf-4.19.90-2608.5.0.0387.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm perf-debuginfo-4.19.90-2608.5.0.0387.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm python2-perf-4.19.90-2608.5.0.0387.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm python2-perf-debuginfo-4.19.90-2608.5.0.0387.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm python3-perf-4.19.90-2608.5.0.0387.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm python3-perf-debuginfo-4.19.90-2608.5.0.0387.oe2003sp4.aarch64.rpm bpftool-4.19.90-2608.5.0.0387.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm bpftool-debuginfo-4.19.90-2608.5.0.0387.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm kernel-4.19.90-2608.5.0.0387.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm kernel-debuginfo-4.19.90-2608.5.0.0387.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm kernel-debugsource-4.19.90-2608.5.0.0387.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm kernel-devel-4.19.90-2608.5.0.0387.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm kernel-source-4.19.90-2608.5.0.0387.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm kernel-tools-4.19.90-2608.5.0.0387.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm kernel-tools-debuginfo-4.19.90-2608.5.0.0387.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm kernel-tools-devel-4.19.90-2608.5.0.0387.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm perf-4.19.90-2608.5.0.0387.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm perf-debuginfo-4.19.90-2608.5.0.0387.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm python2-perf-4.19.90-2608.5.0.0387.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm python2-perf-debuginfo-4.19.90-2608.5.0.0387.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm python3-perf-4.19.90-2608.5.0.0387.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm python3-perf-debuginfo-4.19.90-2608.5.0.0387.oe2003sp4.x86_64.rpm kernel-4.19.90-2608.5.0.0387.oe2003sp4.src.rpm In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ceph: fix pre-auth out-of-bounds read on snaptrace in ceph_handle_caps() ceph_handle_caps() reads snap_trace_len from the wire-format ceph_mds_caps header and uses it unconditionally to build a fake end pointer (snaptrace + snaptrace_len) that is later handed to ceph_update_snap_trace() in the CEPH_CAP_OP_IMPORT case: snaptrace = h + 1; snaptrace_len = le32_to_cpu(h->snap_trace_len); p = snaptrace + snaptrace_len; ... case CEPH_CAP_OP_IMPORT: if (snaptrace_len) { ... if (ceph_update_snap_trace(mdsc, snaptrace, snaptrace + snaptrace_len, false, &realm)) { ... } ceph_update_snap_trace() then decodes a struct ceph_mds_snap_realm from snaptrace using ceph_decode_need(&p, e, sizeof(*ri), bad) with the attacker-supplied fake end e == snaptrace + snaptrace_len. With snaptrace_len == 0xFFFFFFFF the bound check is trivially satisfied, ri = p reads sizeof(struct ceph_mds_snap_realm) past the legitimate msg->front buffer, and ri->num_snaps / ri->num_prior_parent_snaps then drive further out-of-bounds reads of the encoded snap arrays. The eleven msg_version >= 2 .. msg_version >= 12 decoder blocks above the op switch each catch this OOB through their ceph_decode_*_safe() / ceph_decode_need() helpers, but they sit behind a hdr.version-gated if, so a malicious or compromised MDS that sets msg->hdr.version = 1 reaches the IMPORT path with no version-gated decoder having validated snap_trace_len. The shape has been present since ceph_handle_caps() was introduced. Validate snap_trace_len against the message front buffer before consuming it, using the canonical ceph_decode_need() / ceph_has_room() helper. The helper bounds the length with subtraction (n <= end - p, guarded by end >= p) rather than pointer addition, so it is wrap-safe for the attacker-controlled u32 length on 32-bit builds where p + snap_trace_len could overflow the address space. This matches the rest of the ceph decode path (e.g. the pool_ns_len check a few lines below), and the existing goto bad cleanup already covers this exit path. 2026-08-30 CVE-2026-68160 openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4 Critical 9.8 AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H kernel security update 2026-08-30 https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-3531