An update for glibc is now available for openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1 Security Advisory openeuler-security@openeuler.org openEuler security committee openEuler-SA-2026-4813 Final 1.0 1.0 2026-11-11 Initial 2026-11-11 2026-11-11 openEuler SA Tool V1.0 2026-11-11 glibc security update An update for glibc is now available for openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1 The GNU C Library project provides the core libraries for the GNU system and GNU/Linux systems, as well as many other systems that use Linux as the kernel. These libraries provide critical APIs including ISO C11, POSIX.1-2008, BSD, OS-specific APIs and more. These APIs include such foundational facilities as open, read, write, malloc, printf, getaddrinfo, dlopen, pthread_create, crypt, login, exit and more. Security Fix(es): The gettext family of functions in the GNU C Library version 2.0 and later accept LANGUAGE environment variable entries that contain '/' or that are equal to "..", unless the program is setuid or setgid (AT_SECURE). An attacker who can set LANGUAGE in the environment of a program that uses gettext can make it load a message catalog (.mo file) from an arbitrary location in the file system. A crafted .mo file can crash the program through out-of-range offsets, or supply translations whose format directives do not match the arguments passed by the program. That causes undefined behaviour in the printf family of functions and may allow arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the program. The safety of message catalogs relies on them being installed in trusted, read-only locations, and the directory traversal bypasses this. The fix for CVE-2014-0475 rejects ".." path components in locale names passed to setlocale or taken from the LC_ALL, LC_* and LANG environment variables. gettext reads LANGUAGE directly and appends each colon-separated entry to the message catalog directory, so that fix did not cover LANGUAGE. LANGUAGE is only used when the LC_MESSAGES locale is not "C", "C.<encoding>" or "POSIX", so the attacker must also be able to select another installed locale, for example through LANG or LC_ALL. Exploitation also requires that the attacker can place the crafted file in a location readable by the target program, and that the environment crosses a trust boundary without the program running as AT_SECURE. An example is an SSH server that accepts LANGUAGE and LANG from clients through the AcceptEnv directive and restricts an account to a forced command; the attacker may use this to escape the restriction.(CVE-2026-84243) An update for glibc is now available for openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1. openEuler Security has rated this update as having a security impact of high. A Common Vunlnerability Scoring System(CVSS)base score,which gives a detailed severity rating, is available for each vulnerability from the CVElink(s) in the References section. High glibc https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-4813 https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-84243 https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-84243 openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1 glibc-2.38-131.oe2403sp1.aarch64.rpm glibc-all-langpacks-2.38-131.oe2403sp1.aarch64.rpm glibc-common-2.38-131.oe2403sp1.aarch64.rpm glibc-debuginfo-2.38-131.oe2403sp1.aarch64.rpm glibc-debugsource-2.38-131.oe2403sp1.aarch64.rpm glibc-debugutils-2.38-131.oe2403sp1.aarch64.rpm glibc-devel-2.38-131.oe2403sp1.aarch64.rpm glibc-locale-archive-2.38-131.oe2403sp1.aarch64.rpm glibc-locale-source-2.38-131.oe2403sp1.aarch64.rpm glibc-nss-devel-2.38-131.oe2403sp1.aarch64.rpm libnsl-2.38-131.oe2403sp1.aarch64.rpm nscd-2.38-131.oe2403sp1.aarch64.rpm nss_modules-2.38-131.oe2403sp1.aarch64.rpm glibc-2.38-131.oe2403sp1.src.rpm glibc-2.38-131.oe2403sp1.x86_64.rpm glibc-all-langpacks-2.38-131.oe2403sp1.x86_64.rpm glibc-common-2.38-131.oe2403sp1.x86_64.rpm glibc-debuginfo-2.38-131.oe2403sp1.x86_64.rpm glibc-debugsource-2.38-131.oe2403sp1.x86_64.rpm glibc-debugutils-2.38-131.oe2403sp1.x86_64.rpm glibc-devel-2.38-131.oe2403sp1.x86_64.rpm glibc-locale-archive-2.38-131.oe2403sp1.x86_64.rpm glibc-locale-source-2.38-131.oe2403sp1.x86_64.rpm glibc-nss-devel-2.38-131.oe2403sp1.x86_64.rpm libnsl-2.38-131.oe2403sp1.x86_64.rpm nscd-2.38-131.oe2403sp1.x86_64.rpm nss_modules-2.38-131.oe2403sp1.x86_64.rpm glibc-help-2.38-131.oe2403sp1.noarch.rpm The gettext family of functions in the GNU C Library version 2.0 and later accept LANGUAGE environment variable entries that contain '/' or that are equal to "..", unless the program is setuid or setgid (AT_SECURE). An attacker who can set LANGUAGE in the environment of a program that uses gettext can make it load a message catalog (.mo file) from an arbitrary location in the file system. A crafted .mo file can crash the program through out-of-range offsets, or supply translations whose format directives do not match the arguments passed by the program. That causes undefined behaviour in the printf family of functions and may allow arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the program. The safety of message catalogs relies on them being installed in trusted, read-only locations, and the directory traversal bypasses this. The fix for CVE-2014-0475 rejects ".." path components in locale names passed to setlocale or taken from the LC_ALL, LC_* and LANG environment variables. gettext reads LANGUAGE directly and appends each colon-separated entry to the message catalog directory, so that fix did not cover LANGUAGE. LANGUAGE is only used when the LC_MESSAGES locale is not "C", "C.<encoding>" or "POSIX", so the attacker must also be able to select another installed locale, for example through LANG or LC_ALL. Exploitation also requires that the attacker can place the crafted file in a location readable by the target program, and that the environment crosses a trust boundary without the program running as AT_SECURE. An example is an SSH server that accepts LANGUAGE and LANG from clients through the AcceptEnv directive and restricts an account to a forced command; the attacker may use this to escape the restriction. 2026-11-11 CVE-2026-84243 openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1 High 7.0 AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H glibc security update 2026-11-11 https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-4813